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Abstract 
Although microfinance institutions across the world are moving from group lending towards 
individual lending, this strategic shift is not substantiated by sufficient empirical evidence on the 
impact of both types of lending on borrowers. We present such evidence from a randomised field 
experiment in rural Mongolia. We find a positive impact of access to group loans on food 
consumption and entrepreneurship. Among households that were offered group loans the likelihood 
of owning an enterprise increases by 10 per cent more than in control villages. Enterprise profits 
increase over time as well, particularly for the less-educated. For individual lending on the other 
hand, we detect no significant increase in consumption or enterprise ownership. These results are in 
line with theories that stress the disciplining effect of group lending: joint liability may deter 
borrowers from using loans for non-investment purposes. Our results on informal transfers are 
consistent with this hypothesis. Borrowers in group-lending villages are less likely to make informal 
transfers to families and friends while borrowers in individual-lending villages are more likely to do 
so. We find no significant difference in repayment rates between the two lending programmes, 
neither of which entailed weekly repayment meetings. 
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1. Introduction 
The effectiveness of microcredit as a tool to combat poverty is much debated now that after 
years of rapid growth, microfinance institutions (MFIs) in various countries – including India, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nicaragua – are struggling with client overindebtedness, 
repayment problems, and in some cases a political backlash against the microfinance sector 
as a whole. This heightened scepticism, perhaps most strongly voiced by Bateman (2010), 
also follows the publication of the findings – summarised below – of a number of randomised 
field experiments indicating that the impact of microcredit might be more modest than 
thought by its strongest advocates. These studies have tempered the expectations many had 
about the ability of microcredit to lift people out of poverty. 
Much remains unclear about whether, and how, microcredit can help the poor to improve 
their lives. Answering these questions is even more important now that the microcredit 
industry is changing in various ways. In particular, increased scale and professionalisation 
has led a number of leading MFIs to move from group or joint-liability lending, as pioneered 
by the Bangladeshi Grameen bank in the 1970s, to individual micro lending.1 
Under joint liability, small groups of borrowers are responsible for the repayment of each 
other's loans. All group members are treated as being in default when at least one of them 
does not repay and all members are denied subsequent loans. Because co-borrowers act as 
guarantors they screen and monitor each other and in so doing, reduce agency problems 
between the MFI and its borrowers. A potential downside to joint-liability lending is that it 
often involves time-consuming weekly repayment meetings and exerts strong social pressure, 
making it potentially onerous for borrowers. This is one of the main reasons why MFIs have 
started to move from joint to individual lending. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there as yet exists very limited empirical evidence on the relative 
merits of individual and group lending, especially in terms of impacts on borrowers. Both the 
ample theoretical and the more limited empirical literature mainly centre on the impact of 
joint liability on repayment rates. Armendáriz and Morduch (2005, p. 101-102) note that: “In 
a perfect world, empirical researchers would be able to directly compare situations under 
group-lending contracts with comparable situations under traditional banking contracts. The 
1 Liability individualisation is at the core of ”Grameen Bank II”. Large MFIs such as ASA in Bangladesh and 
BancoSol in Bolivia have also moved towards individual lending. Cull, Demirguç-Kunt and Morduch (2009) 
show that joint-liability lenders tend to service poorer households than individual-liability lenders. 
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best test would involve a single lender who employs a range of contracts (…). The best 
evidence would come from well-designed deliberate experiments in which loan contracts are 
varied but everything else is kept the same.” 
This paper provides such evidence from a randomised field experiment among 1,148 poor 
women in 40 villages across rural Mongolia. The aim of the experiment, in which villages 
were randomly assigned to obtain access to group loans, individual loans, or no loans, is to 
measure and compare the impact of both types of microcredit on various poverty measures. 
Importantly, neither the group nor the individual-lending programmes include mandatory 
public repayment meetings and are thus relatively flexible forms of microcredit. 
The loans provided by the programmes we investigate are relatively small, targeted at female 
borrowers, and progressive: successful loan repayment gives access to another loan cycle, 
with reduced interest rates, as is the case with many microcredit programmes. Our evaluation 
is based on two rounds of data collection: a baseline survey collected before the start of the 
loans and a follow-up survey collected 18 months (and potentially several loan cycles) after 
the baseline. 
Although the loans provided under this experiment were originally intended to finance 
business creation, we find that in both the group – and in the individual-lending villages, 
about one half of all credit is used for household rather than business goals. Women who 
obtained access to microcredit often used the loans to purchase household assets, in particular 
large domestic appliances. Only among women that were offered group loans do we find an 
impact on business creation: the likelihood of owning an enterprise increases for these 
women by 10 per cent more than in control villages. We also document an increase in 
enterprise profits but only for villages that had access to microcredit for longer periods of 
time. In terms of poverty impact, we find a substantial positive effect of access to group loans 
on food consumption, particularly of fruit, vegetables, dairy products and non-alcoholic 
beverages. 
In terms of individual lending, overall we document no increase in enterprise ownership, 
although there is some evidence that as time passes women in these villages are more likely 
to set up an enterprise jointly with their spouse. Among women in individual-lending villages 
we also detect no significant increase in (non-durable) consumption, although we find that 
women with low levels of education are significantly more likely to consume more. 
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The stronger impact on consumption and business creation in group-lending villages, after 
several loan cycles, may indicate that group loans are more effective at increasing the 
permanent income of households, although we detect no evidence of higher income in either 
individual- or group-lending villages, relative to controls. If one were to take at face value the 
evidence on the larger impact of group loans, one would want to ask why such loans are more 
effective at raising consumption (and probably long-term income). One possibility is that the 
joint-liability scheme better ensures discipline in terms of project selection and execution, so 
that larger long-run effects are achieved. We document results on informal transfers that 
support this hypothesis: women in group-lending villages decrease their transfers to families 
and friends, contrary to what we find for women in individual-lending villages.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the related 
literature and is followed by a description of our experiment in Section 3. Section 4 then 
explains our estimation methodology and Section 5 provides the main results. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Related literature 
This paper provides a comparative analysis of individual versus joint-liability microcredit and 
as such is related to the theoretical literature on joint-liability lending that emerged over the 
last two decades.2 Notwithstanding the richness of this literature, the impact of joint liability 
on risk-taking and investment behaviour remains ambiguous. For example, on the one hand, 
group lending may encourage moral hazard if clients shift to riskier projects when they 
expect to be bailed out by co-borrowers. On the other hand, joint liability may stimulate 
borrowers to reduce the risk undertaken by co-borrowers since they will get punished if a co-
borrower defaults. 
Giné, Jakiela, Karlan and Morduch (2010) find, based on laboratory-style experiments in a 
Peruvian market, that contrary to much of the theoretical literature, joint liability stimulates 
risk-taking – at least when borrowers know the investment strategies of co-borrowers. When 
borrowers could self-select into groups there was a strong negative effect on risk-taking due 
to assortative matching. Fischer (2010) undertakes similar laboratory-style experiments and 
also finds that under limited information, group liability stimulates risk-taking as borrowers 
free-ride on the insurance provided by co-borrowers (see also Wydick, 1999). However, 
when co-borrowers have to give upfront approval for each others' projects, ex ante moral 
hazard is mitigated. Giné and Karlan (2010) examine the impact of joint liability on 
repayment rates through two randomised experiments in the Philippines.3 They find that 
removing group liability, or introducing individual liability from scratch, did not affect 
repayment rates over the ensuing three years. In a related study, Carpena, Vole, Shapiro and 
Zia (2010) exploit a quasi-experiment in which an Indian MFI switched from individual to 
joint-liability contracts, the reverse of the switch in Giné and Karlan (2010). They find that 
joint liability significantly improves loan repayment rates. 
To the best of our knowledge, there as yet exists no comparative empirical evidence on the 
merits of both types of lending from the borrower's perspective. Earlier studies that focus on 
the development impact of microcredit study either individual or joint-liability microcredit, 
not both in the same framework. In an early contribution, Khandker and Pitt (1998) and 
2 See Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for an early summary. Theory suggests that joint liability may reduce 
adverse selection (Ghatak, 1999/2000 and Gangopadhyay, Ghatak and Lensink, 2005); ex ante moral hazard by 
preventing excessively risky projects and shirking (Stiglitz, 1990; Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 1994 and 
Laffont and Rey, 2003); and ex post moral hazard by preventing non-repayment in case of successful projects 
(Besley and Coate, 1995 and Bhole and Ogden, 2010). 
3 Ahlin and Townsend (2007) empirically test various repayment determinants in a joint-liability context. 
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Khandker (2005) use a quasi-experimental approach and find a positive impact of joint-
liability microcredit on household consumption in Bangladesh, although one must 
acknowledge the possibility of omitted variable and selection bias. Morduch (1998) and 
Morduch and Roodman (2009) replicate the Bangladeshi studies and find no evidence of a 
causal impact of microcredit on consumption. Kaboski and Townsend (2005) also use non-
experimental data and document a positive impact of joint-liability microcredit on 
consumption but not on investments in Thailand. Based on a structural approach the authors 
corroborate this finding in Kaboski and Townsend (2011). Bruhn and Love (2009) use non-
random opening of bank branches in Mexico to analyse the impact of access to individual 
loans on entrepreneurship and income. They find that branch openings led to an increase in 
informal entrepreneurship among men but not women. Because women in “treated” 
municipalities start to work more as wage-earners they eventually increased their income too. 
More recently, randomised field experiments have been used to rigorously evaluate 
development policies, including microcredit (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2008). 
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2010) randomly phase in access to joint-liability 
microcredit in the Indian city of Hyderabad. The authors find a positive impact on business 
creation and investments by existing businesses, while the impact on consumption is 
heterogeneous. Those that start an enterprise reduce their non-durable consumption so they 
can pay for the fixed cost of the start-up (which typically exceeds the available loan amount). 
In contrast, non-entrepreneurs increase their non-durable consumption. Crépon, Devoto, 
Duflo and Parienté (2011) find that the introduction of joint-liability loans in rural Morocco 
led to a significant expansion of the scale of pre-existing entrepreneurial activities. Here as 
well there was a heterogeneous impact on consumption with those expanding their business 
decreasing their non-durable and overall consumption. 
Two other field experiments focus on individual-liability loans. Karlan and Zinman (2011) 
instructed loan officers in the Philippines to randomly reconsider applicants that had been 
labelled “marginal” by a credit-scoring model. They find that access to loans reduced the 
number and size of businesses operated by those who received a loan. In a similar vein, 
Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart and Meghir (2011) analyse the impact of microcredit on 
marginal borrowers of a Bosnian MFI. In contrast to Karlan and Zinman (2011), they find 
that microcredit increased entrepreneurship although the impact was heterogeneous – similar 
to Banerjee et al. (2010) and Crépon (2011). Because micro loans only partially relaxed 
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liquidity constraints, households had to find additional resources to finance investments. 
Households that already had a business and that were highly educated did so by drawing on 
savings. In contrast, business start-ups and less-educated households, with insufficient 
savings, had to cut back consumption. These households also reduced the school attendance 
of young adults aged 16-19. 
Our paper is the first to use the same experimental context to compare the impact of 
individual versus joint-liability microcredit on borrowers.  
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3. The experiment 
3.1. Background 
Microfinance, as it is known today, originated in Bangladesh – one of the most densely 
populated parts of the world with 1,127 people per km2 – but has also taken hold in less-
populated countries. One of these is Mongolia, which encompasses a land area half the size 
of India but with less than 1 per cent of its number of inhabitants. This makes it the least 
densely populated country in the world with just 1.7 people per km2.4 This extremely low 
population density means that disbursing, monitoring and collecting small loans to and from 
remote borrowers is very costly, particularly in rural areas. Mongolian MFIs are therefore 
constantly looking for cost-efficient ways to service such borrowers. 
Mongolian microcredit has traditionally been provided in the form of individual loans, 
reflecting concerns that the nomadic lifestyle of indigenous Mongolians had impeded the 
build up of social capital outside of the family. Notwithstanding such concerns, informal 
collective self-help groups (nukhurlul) have developed and some of these have started to 
provide small loans to their members, in effect operating as informal savings and credit 
cooperatives. This indicates that group lending might be feasible in rural Mongolia too. 
Moreover, recent theoretical work suggests that when group contracts are sufficiently 
flexible, group loans can be superior to individual loans even in the absence of social capital 
(Bhole and Oden, 2010). This implies that group lending may also work in countries where 
social connectedness and the threat of social sanctions is relatively limited. 
This paper describes a randomised field experiment conducted in cooperation with XacBank, 
one of Mongolia's main banks and the second-largest provider of microfinance in the country, 
to compare the impact of individual and group loans on borrowers' living standards.5 While 
XacBank provides both men and women with microcredit, our experiment focused on 
extending credit to relatively less well-off women in rural areas. This specific target group 
was believed to have considerably less access to formal credit compared with richer, male 
4 Source: United Nations World Population Prospects (2005). Mongolia has a semi-arid continental climate and 
an economy dominated by pastoral livestock husbandry, mining and quarrying. Extreme weather conditions – 
droughts and harsh winters with temperatures falling below -35º C – frequently lead to large-scale livestock 
deaths. 
5 According to XacBank's mission statement, it intends to foster Mongolia's socio-economic development by 
providing access to comprehensive financial services to citizens and firms, including those that are normally 
excluded such as low-income and remote rural clients. The bank aims to maximise the value of shareholders’ 
investment while creating a profitable and sustainable institution. 
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and urban Mongolians. According to the Mongolian National Statistics Office (2006, p. 54): 
“Microcredit appears to be unavailable to most of the poor living in the aimag and soum 
centers. Their normal channels for credit are to borrow from a shop or kiosk where they 
often buy supplies or from a relative or friend”.6 
3.2. Experimental design 
The experiment took place in 40 soum centers (henceforth known as villages) across five 
aimags (henceforth known as provinces) in northern Mongolia. Chart A1 in the Annex maps 
the geographical location of all participating villages and provinces. The experiment started 
in January-February 2008 when XacBank loan officers and representatives of the Mongolian 
Women's Federation (MWF) organised information sessions in all 40 villages.7 The goal and 
logistics of the experiment were explained and it was made clear to potential borrowers that 
there was a two-thirds probability that XacBank would start lending in their village during the 
experiment and that lending could take the form of either individual or group loans. Women 
who wished to participate could sign up and were asked to form potential groups of about 7 
to 15 persons each. Because of our focus on relatively poor women, the eligibility criteria 
stated that participants should in principle own less than 1 million Mongolian tögrög (MNT) 
(USD 869) in assets and earn less than MNT 200,000 (USD 174) in monthly profits from a 
business.8 Many of these women were on official “poor lists” compiled by district 
governments. 
Various indicators show that the households in our sample lie markedly below the Mongolian 
average in terms of income, expenditures and social status. Data from the Mongolian 
statistical office indicate that the average rural household in 2007 had an annual income of 
MNT 3,005,000 (USD 2,610) whereas the average household in our sample earned MNT 
1,100,000 (USD 955) (we define earnings as profits from household enterprises plus wages 
6 Mongolia is divided into 18 aimags or provinces which are subdivided into 342 soums or districts. Each soum 
contains a small village or soum centre of on average 1 kilometre in diameter. The average soum in our 
experiment had 3,853 inhabitants of which on average 1,106 people (314 households) lived in the central 
village. The average distance from a village to the nearest province centre – small towns where XacBank's 
branches and loan officers are based – is 116 kilometres. Because the distance between a village and the nearest 
paved road is on average 170 kilometres, travel between villages, and between villages and province centres, is 
time consuming and costly. 
7 The MWF is a large NGO whose representatives worked together with XacBank and the research team to 
ensure a smooth implementation of the experiment. They signed up participants, facilitated group formation in 
the group-lending villages, provided information to loan applicants and assisted the survey company. 
8 We use a MNT/USD exchange rate of 1,150 which was the average exchange rate during the first half of 2008. 
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from formal employment by all household members). Similar patterns emerge when we 
compare expenditure levels, using data from the Mongolian statistical office or the EBRD 
2006 Life in Transition Survey, or when we compare livestock ownership, a primary wealth 
indicator in Mongolia. 
After about 30 women had signed up in each village, a detailed baseline survey was 
administered to all 1,148 participants during March-April 2008. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted by a specialised survey firm hired by the research team and independent of 
XacBank. Interviews were held at a central location in each village where respondents and 
interviewers had sufficient time to go through the questions without interruptions. Use of a 
central location also minimised the risk that the female respondents would give biased 
answers due to the presence of older and/or male family members (as had happened during 
piloting). Interviews lasted approximately one hour. At the time of the baseline survey we 
also collected information on the main socioeconomic, demographic and geographic 
characteristics of the 40 villages. 
The baseline survey measured variables that reflect households' standards of living and could 
be expected to change over the 1.5 year interval of the experiment. These include income, 
consumption and savings; entrepreneurial activity and labour supply; asset ownership and 
debt; and informal transfers. In addition, information was elicited about household 
composition and education; exposure to economic shocks; and respondents' income 
expectations. The surveys also collected information on context-specific poverty indicators 
such as livestock ownership and the quality and size of the dwelling, usually a ger.9 
Randomisation took place after completion of the baseline survey so that at the time of the 
interview, respondents did not know whether or not they would be offered a group loan, an 
individual loan, or no loan at all. Randomisation took place at the village level, with 15 
villages receiving access to individual loans, 15 receiving access to group loans, while in 10 
control villages XacBank did not provide loans to the participating women for the duration of 
the experiment. In all three types of villages XacBank continued to provide individual micro 
loans to regular, more wealthy clients most of whom were male. 
9 A ger is a portable tent made from a wood frame and felt coverings. Its size is measured by the number of 
lattice wall sections (khana). A basic ger consists of four or five khana, with larger and less common sizes 
including six, eight or ten khana. Bigger gers are a sign of wealth as they are more costly to heat. A sufficiently 
insulated ger has two layers of protective felt, whereas poorer households often only have one layer. Gers are 
sometimes surrounded by (costly) wooden fences (hashaa) that offer protection from the wind. 
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Randomisation across rather than within villages was chosen because it was administratively 
and politically easier to manage. Moreover, randomisation across villages avoids the 
possibility that the programme affects even individuals who do not receive it directly, through 
informal transfers and connections. We also stratified at the province level because a 
completely randomised design could have resulted in a situation whereby some provinces 
contained only treatment or control villages, which was unacceptable to XacBank. Also, to 
the extent that geographical or economical differences between provinces are large, we might 
not have been able to detect treatment differences in an unstratified design. 
After randomisation, group formation proceeded in the 15 group-lending villages, but not in 
the individual-lending and control villages. Group formation consisted of the development of 
internal procedures, the election of a group leader and the signing of a group charter. Groups 
were formed by the women themselves, not by XacBank. A maximum of two women per 
group were allowed to be from the same family. Group members lived in the same village 
and already knew each other to varying degrees. In many cases actual group composition 
differed substantially from the potential groups that were identified at the very beginning of 
the experiment when women had to indicate their interest (or not) to participate in the project. 
After a group had collected enough internal savings it could apply for its first XacBank loan. 
We provide detailed information on the type of loans offered in Section 3.4 below.  
The “treatment period” during which XacBank provided loans in the group and individual 
lending villages lasted 1.5 years – from April 2008 to September 2009 – with some variation 
across villages. During this period participating women in treatment villages could apply for 
(repeat) loans, while XacBank refrained from lending in the control villages. In October-
November 2009 we conducted a follow-up survey to again measure the poverty status and 
economic activity of our sample of participating women. We also obtained information on 
how women had used their XacBank loan(s). In addition, we conducted a second village-
level survey to collect information on village characteristics that may have changed, such as 
the prices of important consumer goods. Lastly, XacBank collected repayment information 
on all of its loans for the period April 2008-June 2011. In October 2011 we revisited one 
individual-lending and two group-lending villages for structured interviews and discussions 
with a number of borrowers about how they experienced the lending programmes. 
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3.3. Randomisation 
Table 1 presents a statistical comparison between the control villages and the two types of 
treatment villages. We compare the means of various characteristics of the villages 
themselves and of the respondents and their households. Treatment and control villages are 
very similar overall, and in particular in terms of size, number of inhabitants, distance to the 
nearest province centre and the nearest paved road, and the prices of various consumption 
goods (Panel A). Panel B shows that the respondents living in the treatment and control 
villages are on average very similar too. 
We find no significant differences in household structure, informal transfers, self-
employment, wage earnings, the value of the dwelling or consumption patterns. Households 
are also very similar in terms of a large number of other consumption and asset-ownership 
measures (not shown but available on request). 
Panel C also shows no significant differences between control and treatment villages in terms 
of the number and type of businesses operated by our respondents and their households. We 
do find, however, some differences in terms of access to finance at the household level. A 
majority of the households had at least one loan outstanding at the time of the baseline survey 
and this percentage is higher in the individual-lending villages (67 per cent) than in the 
control villages (56 per cent). However, conditional on having at least one loan, there are no 
significant differences between the treatment and control villages in the average number of 
loans per household, the total debt value (in absolute terms and as a percentage of household 
income) and the debt-service burden. 
These figures also indicate that at the time of our baseline survey the penetration of 
microcredit was already well advanced in rural Mongolia. For our purposes, however, an 
important question is whether households were already using their access to microcredit to 
finance entrepreneurial activities by our female respondents. Our baseline data show that this 
appears not to be the case. First, from Panel C we see that around 75 per cent of all 
outstanding loans were used for consumption, mainly to buy electric household appliances, 
instead of income generation. This picture is the same across all types of villages. 
 
Milk Mutton Bread
Control 1,017 3,530 2,823 128,747 1.7 0.6 185 220 113 218 628 2,967 1,035
Treatment 1,136 3,961 3,415 167,728 2.2 0.7 165 272 117 200 797 2,833 790
P‐value (0.35) (0.63) (0.24) (0.08)* (0.13) (0.55) (0.73) (0.64) (0.82) (0.7) (0.19) (0.53) (0.25)
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 29 24 39 36 39 33 39
Milk Red meat Vegetables Fuel
Control 1.5 40.4 9.3 6.0 155 241 32.4 29.4 1.43 3.4 5.4 2.2 22.8
Individual 1.6 38.9 9.4 6.4 174 153 33.4 31.8 1.52 4.0 5.2 2.0 18.9
P‐value (0.65) (0.16) (0.66) (0.84) (0.73) (0.17) (0.78) (0.39) (0.71) (0.32) (0.78) (0.57) (0.42)
Group 1.6 39.7 9.6 5.1 196 158 33.5 30.1 1.57 3.2 5 2.0 23.3
P‐value (0.82) (0.48) (0.38) (0.58) (0.73) (0.21) (0.76) (0.79) (0.55) (0.86) (0.54) (0.45) (0.93)
N 1,148 1,147 1,143 1,147 1,147 1,147 1,148 1,148 1,147 1,146 1,139 1,143 1,055
Conditional N 103 174 266
Operates  
business
Female 
business
Hours hired At least one 
loan
Outstanding 
loans
Debt value Debt/HH 
income
Debt service Interest rate Secured 
loans
Percentage 
private use
Percentage 
female 
business
Amount 
female 
business
Control 58.9 64.8 40.9 56 2.6 1.7 0.9 31.7 2.2% 73% 72% 15% 158
Individual 59.8 62.6 54.1 67 2.7 2.0 0.9 45.1 2.1% 77% 74% 11% 140
P‐value (0.88) (0.71) (0.40) (0.00)*** (0.48) (0.44) (0.24) (0.07)* (0.43) (0.44) (0.73) (0.13) (0.71)
Group 60.3 59.3 35.1 62 3.0 1.9 1.1 40.8 2.3% 73% 79% 10% 140
P‐value (0.80) (0.31) (0.74) (0.13) (0.25)* (0.53) (0.27) (0.29) (0.53) (0.95) (0.13) (0.07)* (0.71)
N 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148
Conditional N 686 591 584 553 518 553 615 614 714 714
Panel A. Village and district characteristics
Panel C. Household characteristics: entrepreneurship and borrowing
Education 
respondent
Table 1. Randomisation and treatment-control balance
This table provides t-test results for means comparisons of household and village characteristics in individual-lending versus control villages and in group-lending versus control villages. P-values are
reported between brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. In case of household characteristics, the standard errors are clustered at the village level. Table A1 provides the
definitions and sources of all variables. N indicates the number of villages (Panel A) or respondents (Panel B and C) for whom information about a given variable is available. Conditional N indicates
the number of respondents for whom the value of the respective variable is strictly positive in the case of conditional variables. E.g. 1,148 women answered the survey question about wage earnings and
266 of them reported positive wage earnings.
Livestock in 
district
District areaPeople in 
district Price
Time to 
paved road
Age 
respondent
Received 
transfers
Banks in districtPeople in 
village
Panel B. Household characteristics: general, consumption, assets
HH death Self‐
employed
Wage 
earnings
Given 
transfers
Time to 
province 
center
Distance to 
paved road
SCCs in 
district 
Children 
<16
Consumption
Value of 
dwelling 
Distance to 
province 
center
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loans were com
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crops. The m
Group m  
                                                           
nvested part of their loan(s) in a business
he female targeted by the loan. Further, while access to credit at the household
ewhat higher in individual-lending villages, Panel C shows that the amount and 
d for female enterprises did not differ significantly between the three 
 had invested on average 15 per cent of their 
ale-run business, whereas these percentages were 11 and 10 per cent 
ages. These percentages, as well as the absolute amounts, 
control and treatment villages. 
isation process was successful: we find very few significant 
ent and control villages, despite considering a broad range of
les. The few differences that do exist are small and do not provide evidence of a
atic disparity between treatment and control villages along any particular dimension. 
domisation ensured absence of selection bias so that we
te any post-treatment differences in outcomes to the lending programmes. 
s to allow women to finance small-scale 
reneurial activities.10 Given the focus on business creation and expansion, loans had a
 of either two months (for loans exceeding six months) or one month (for shorter-
 loans).11 The interest rate varied between 1.5 and 2 per cent per month and was reduced 
cle. Other dynamic incentives included the 
ount and/or maturity after each repaid loan (Table 2). 
 loans were based on joint liability and that XacBank would 
inate lending to the whole group if that group did not fully repay a loan. Most group 
posed of individually approved sub-loans with a maturity between 3 and 12 
group all subloans had the same maturity). 
nce a collective business, for instance to grow 
aximum size of the first loan to a group member was MNT 500,000 (USD 435). 
embers had to agree among themselves who would get a loan and for what purpose.
10 Besides agriculture – both animal husbandry and crop growing – the main village industries are baking, 
wood-processing, retail activities and felt-making. 
11 Field, Pande and Papp (2010) provide evidence from a randomised field experiment in India that indicates 
that a two-month grace period – instead of the regular two weeks – and the associated flexibility led to more 
business creation and investments but also to lower repayment rates. 
They then had to apply for the loan and XacBank screened each application independently.12 
If a borrower’s project was deemed too risky XacBank could exclude it while the other 
members would still get a loan. If most projects were judged to be too risky then the total 
group loan was rejected. Unlike individual loans the screening of group loans thus involved a 
two-stage process: first by co-borrowers and then by a XacBank loan officer. 
 
Individual loans Group loans
Progressive?
Monthly interest rate
Grace period
Repayment frequency
Liability structure Individual Joint
Collateral Yes but flexible approach Joint savings (20% of loan) sometimes 
supplemented by assets
Available maturity 2 to 24 months 3 to 12 months
Average maturity 1st loan 224 days 199 days
Average maturity 2nd loan 234 days 243 days
Average size 1st loan US$ 411 US$ 279
Average size 2nd loan US$ 472 US$ 386
Table 2. The loan products
This table describes the main characteristics of the individual and the group loan products. Average loan size is
calculated conditional on having a loan. Average loan size of group loans refers to loans per borrower not per
group. Loans were disbursed in tögrög not US$. Source of data on maturities and loan size: XacBank.
Monthly, no public repayment meetings. In case of group loans, the group leader 
collects and hands over repayments to the loan officer
Yes: larger loans, lower interest rate, and longer maturity after each successfully 
repaid loan
1.5% to 2%
One or two months depending on loan maturity
 
 
Before applying for a loan, groups had to build up savings in a joint savings account 
equivalent to 20 per cent of the requested loan amount. Group members were in principle 
allowed to pledge assets instead of the compulsory savings although XacBank encouraged 
borrowers to use savings. The savings not only served as collateral but were also a means of 
ascertaining whether potential borrowers had sufficient financial discipline. Group leaders 
were responsible for monitoring and collecting loan repayments and handing them over to the 
loan officer on a monthly basis. There were no public repayment meetings or other 
                                                           
12 All loan officers were female, between 21 and 27 years old, married with one or two children, and had 
completed at least a four-year university degree. They normally assess between 35 (Hentii province) and 50 
(Hovsgol province) loan applications per month with an approval rate of about 90 per cent. 
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mandatory meetings.13 Groups decided themselves on the modalities of their cooperation, 
including the frequency of meetings (typically once per month). 
Individual loans were similar to the subloans provided to group members, although larger on 
average. XacBank did not use predetermined collateral requirements but took collateral if 
available. As a result 91 per cent of the individual loans were collateralised, with the average 
collateral value close to 90 per cent of the loan amount. The maturity of individual loans 
ranged from 2 to 24 months, depending on the experience of the borrower and the type of 
business being invested in. Group loans had a somewhat shorter maturity (192 days on 
average) than individual loans (245 days) which reflects the smaller size of the former. 
Similar to group loans, individual loans did not involve any mandatory group activities such 
as repayment meetings. 
3.5. Loan take-up 
After the baseline survey XacBank started disbursing individual (group) loans in individual 
(group) treatment villages. All women who had signed up and expressed an initial interest in 
borrowing were visited by a loan officer and received a first loan after a successful screening. 
After 1.5 years, 54 per cent of all treatment respondents had borrowed from XacBank: 57 per 
cent in the group-lending villages and 50 per cent in the individual-lending villages. Although 
other MFIs were also lending in both the treatment and control villages during the 
experiment, our intervention led to a significant increase in borrowing. The probability of 
receiving microcredit during the experiment was 24 percentage points higher in treatment 
than in control villages (50 per cent of respondents in control villages versus 74 per cent in 
treatment villages). 
We use information from the follow-up survey to better understand why a relatively large 
proportion of women in treatment villages did not borrow. First, the data show that of the 326 
women who had initially signed up in the treatment villages but who did not get a loan during 
the experiment, 167 (51 per cent) never actually applied for a loan. At the time of signing up 
women did not know whether they would get access to an individual or a group loan (or end 
up in a control village). Some women may only have been interested in an individual (group) 
loan and may therefore not have applied when their village was assigned to group 
(individual) lending. 
13 Field and Pande (2008) randomly assign weekly and monthly repayment meetings and find that a more 
flexible schedule can significantly lower transaction costs without increasing defaults. 
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Second, of the non-borrowers who had applied for a loan, 47 per cent refused the offer made 
by XacBank. The main reasons stated for not taking up the loan were that the amount was too 
small, the interest rate too high, or the repayment schedule unsuitable. In total, about 75 per 
cent of the “non-treatment” was therefore due to women who either did not apply for a loan 
or who applied for one but subsequently refused the offer. This leaves about a quarter of all 
“untreated” women who were actually refused a loan by XacBank. 
When we asked respondents during the follow-up survey why XacBank had refused them a 
loan, the main answers were “too much outstanding debt” and “insufficient collateral”. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, the baseline survey revealed that many households already had at 
least one micro loan, mainly for consumption purposes. Interviews with loan officers 
indicated that existing debt at the household level made them hesitant to provide additional 
loans to female household members, even though these new loans were intended for 
entrepreneurial purposes rather than for consumption. At the time the Mongolian Central 
Bank had also become increasingly concerned about overindebtedness in rural areas. Loan 
officers may have been particularly conservative in lending to poorer-than-usual borrowers, 
despite having been explicitly instructed to do so by XacBank management.14 
The experiment also partly coincided with the global financial crisis during which Mongolian 
financial institutions suffered from reduced access to foreign funding. Domestic funding 
constraints also tightened. The Mongolian Central Bank imposed higher reserve requirements 
in an attempt to stem inflation while deposit inflows were below average as herders suffered 
from low international cashmere prices. The confluence of these three factors made interbank 
liquidity dry up between March and late June 2008 and correspondingly XacBank reduced its 
credit supply. The year-on-year growth rate of business lending even turned negative in 
November 2008, not reverting to positive territory until July 2009. 
Table 3 displays the results of reduced-form probit regressions to explain the probability of 
loan take-up in more detail. We find a higher probability of borrowing in group-lending 
villages (significant at the 10 per cent level). A closer inspection of the underlying data 
indicates that the higher lending probability in group-lending villages is not driven by 
XacBank covering some (group) villages earlier than others or by the follow-up survey being 
14 XacBank provided 375 out of 534 applicants with a loan, an approval rate of 70.2 per cent. This is below the 
regular approval rate, which is about 95 per cent according to Xacbank’s own management information system 
and about 90 per cent according to the answers of the loan officers during the loan officer baseline survey. 
conducted earlier in individual-lending villages. Instead, demand for loans may have been 
lower in individual-lending villages either because the availability of microcredit was 
somewhat higher in the first place (see Panel C of Table 1) or because access to group loans 
(previously unavailable to anyone in these villages) was valued more than access to 
individual loans (previously available). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group village 0.120* 0.120*
(0.0692) (0.0638)
Outstanding loans ‐0.00414 ‐0.00207 ‐0.0525 ‐0.00377 0.0457 0.0349
(0.0296) (0.0285) (0.0377) (0.0393) (0.0386) (0.0407)
Prior loans ‐0.00566 ‐0.00899 ‐0.00760 ‐0.0130** ‐0.00335 ‐0.00488
(0.00738) (0.00777) (0.00650) (0.00569) (0.0155) (0.0164)
Highly educated 0.0435 0.0309 ‐0.0526 ‐0.0774 0.111* 0.110*
(0.0577) (0.0559) (0.0982) (0.0948) (0.0608) (0.0637)
Owns dwelling 0.0778 0.0887 0.0961 0.131 0.0431 0.0565
(0.0730) (0.0743) (0.137) (0.149) (0.0792) (0.0854)
Owns fence 0.0946** 0.0690 0.195*** 0.0968* 0.00530 0.0249
(0.0458) (0.0424) (0.0649) (0.0543) (0.0521) (0.0504)
Owns well 0.142*** 0.109** 0.109 0.145** 0.163*** 0.0711
(0.0547) (0.0535) (0.0829) (0.0712) (0.0505) (0.0627)
Owns vehicle ‐0.00679 ‐0.0234 0.00294 ‐0.00606 ‐0.00793 ‐0.0371
(0.0419) (0.0401) (0.0602) (0.0530) (0.0576) (0.0574)
Owns tools/machinery 0.0793* 0.128*** 0.0268 0.117** 0.124** 0.148***
(0.0405) (0.0344) (0.0522) (0.0464) (0.0528) (0.0455)
Owns animals 0.00364 ‐0.0193 ‐0.0250 ‐0.0746* 0.0273 0.0366
(0.0415) (0.0408) (0.0354) (0.0393) (0.0741) (0.0707)
HH death ‐0.0223 ‐0.0307 ‐0.153 ‐0.141 0.0716 0.0625
(0.0789) (0.0816) (0.110) (0.115) (0.105) (0.110)
Province fixed effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 830 830 397 397 433 433
Pseudo R‐squared 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.06
Table 3. Loan take-up
This table presents probit regressions to explain the probability of loan take-up in the individual and
group lending villages. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
All villages Group villages Individual villages
 
 
Interestingly, the number (or amount) of outstanding loans at the time of the baseline survey 
is not negatively associated with the probability of obtaining a loan during the experiment 
(for example, because households had already reached their borrowing capacity, either 
according to their own judgment or that of the loan officer). We do find a negative but 
imprecisely measured association with previous loans, that is, loans that had been repaid at 
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the time of the baseline survey. Prior use of loans could indicate borrower quality in which 
case one would expect a positive sign. A negative sign may indicate that previous borrowers 
no longer require loans, or that they were not satisfied with the loan product. Note that the 
prior loan variable is significantly negative in the group-village specification (when province 
fixed effects are included) indicating that borrowers with no or limited borrowing experience 
were particularly likely to participate in a group loan. This may indicate that even when 
individual loans are available some women may only be interested in applying for a group 
loan. 
Lastly, households who own a well, fence, or tools and machinery had a higher probability of 
getting a loan, either because they are more wealthy or could use these items as collateral. 
3.6. Attrition 
The follow-up survey took place approximately 1.5 years after the baseline survey and 86 per 
cent of respondents were successfully re-interviewed. While an attrition rate of 14 per cent is 
relatively low, there is always the concern that non-response was not random across treatment 
and control villages, which could bias the estimated treatment effects. To investigate this, we 
estimate the probability of attrition as a function of treatment village dummies as well as a 
range of respondent, village and household characteristics. 
Table 4 shows that respondents in individual-lending villages are almost 7 percentage points 
more likely to attrit compared with those in control villages, and this is of borderline 
statistical significance at conventional levels (depending on the inclusion of control variables 
and/or province fixed effects). We detect no differential patterns in attrition between group 
and control villages. On further investigation, we find that the differential attrition is driven 
by two individual-lending villages where the wedding season was under way at the time of 
the follow-up survey, resulting in many respondents being away from home temporarily. We 
are thus reassured that the reason for higher attrition is unlikely to be related to the 
programme, and so we retain these two villages in the analysis. While one might think that 
loan use might be distorted due to the wedding season, we note that we also estimate all 
models excluding these two villages and find that our results are robust. 
Lastly, we note that other variables have the expected association with attrition: respondents 
that own a fence or a well and families with more women and small children are less likely to 
attrit – as one would expect, given that these characteristics are generally associated with less 
mobility. Households that live further from the province centre and/or own horses or camels 
are more likely to attrit, presumably because they are more likely to live a semi-nomadic 
lifestyle and are thus more difficult to locate for interviews. Households that experienced a 
recent death were less likely to participate in the follow-up survey too. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual village 0.0696 0.0663* 0.0688** 0.0640*
(0.106) (0.0969) (0.0392) (0.0570)
Group village 0.0155 0.0145 0.0325 0.0322
(0.726) (0.708) (0.388) (0.356)
Highly educated 0.0253 0.0223
(0.467) (0.517)
Male adults in HH 0.0190 0.0203
(0.142) (0.117)
Female adults in HH ‐0.0255** ‐0.0250**
(0.0158) (0.0181)
Children < 16 ‐0.0193* ‐0.0173
(0.0628) (0.104)
Age respondent ‐0.00333** ‐0.00337**
(0.0174) (0.0138)
Distance to province center 0.000390* 0.0004**
(0.0647) (0.0411)
Owns dwelling 0.0263 0.0254
(0.145) (0.161)
Owns fence ‐0.0813*** ‐0.0761***
(0.000) (0.000)
Owns other property ‐0.0339 ‐0.0342
(0.189) (0.173)
Ownes well ‐0.0801** ‐0.0823**
(0.0235) (0.0283)
Owns cattle ‐0.0210 ‐0.0151
(0.444) (0.607)
Owns horses or camels 0.0634*** 0.0649***
‐0.003 (0.003)
Owns other animals ‐0.0184 ‐0.0220
(0.399) (0.323)
HH death 0.110** 0.111**
(0.0401) (0.0384)
Province fixed effects? No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,115 1,115 1,115 1,115
Pseudo R‐squared 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07
Table 4. Attrition
This table presents probit regressions to explain the probability of non-participation in the
follow-up survey. P-values are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
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4. Methodology 
In what follows, we report the results of an intention to treat (ITT) analysis where we 
compare all women who initially signed up in treatment villages, irrespective of whether they 
borrowed or not, with those who signed up in control villages.15 The advantage of this 
conservative approach is that we can interpret the experimental intervention as a policy and 
learn about the impact on the population that XacBank initially targeted, and not just on those 
who actually borrowed. We also employed an instrumental variables (IV) methodology in 
which we instrument actual borrowing status of participants with a dummy indicating 
whether or not the village was randomised to be a treatment village. These IV results are very 
similar to the ITT findings described below and are available on request. 
Results reported here use a difference-in-differences technique to compare respondents in 
treatment and control villages before and after the loan treatment.16 While in principle we 
could attribute post-treatment differences to the lending programmes, we improve precision 
slightly when we take various baseline characteristics into account that are strong 
determinants of the outcome variables. All findings remain very similar if we use post-
treatment data only. Our basic regression framework is: 
 
    ivtivttvtvivt XFFGFIY   06543210   (1) 
 
where: 
•  is the outcome variable of interest for individual i in village v at time t (t=0 (1) at 
baseline (follow-up) survey) 
ivtY
•  is a binary variable equal to 1 for individual-lending villages (0 otherwise) vI
•  is a binary variable equal to 1 for group-lending villages (0 otherwise) vG
                                                           
15 One can calculate the impact of access to microcredit on those women who actually borrowed – that is, the 
average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) – by dividing the ITT effect by the probability of receiving 
treatment (57 per cent in the group-lending villages and 50 per cent in the individual-lending villages). A caveat 
is that this may not generalise, as those who receive the treatment may be systematically different from those 
who do not. As the (heroic) assumption underlying consistent estimation of ATT is that unobservable 
characteristics do not affect the decision to participate, we only show ITT parameters. 
16 We estimate using OLS for continuous dependent variables, a probit model for binary dependent variables, 
and a tobit model for dependent variables that are censored at zero. 
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•  is a follow-up binary variable (0 for baseline observations) tF
•  is a set of baseline characteristics of respondents, their households, and their villages ivoX
• ivt  is an i.i.d. error term clustered at the village level. 
 
In this specification 2  and 4  measure the impact of the individual and group lending 
treatment, respectively. In addition, we also run more flexible specifications where we allow 
for heterogeneous impacts. We first allow for variation by education level of the respondent, 
which we consider to be an indicator of long-term poverty of the household: 
 
    ivtivittvtvivt XZHFFGFIY   012543210   (2) 
 
where 
 
    ttvtv FFGFIZ  11109876   
 
and  is one for individuals with a high education level (grade 8 or higher, or vocational 
training) and zero for individuals with a low education level (less than grade 8). All other 
variables are as previously defined. 
iH
Second, because respondents in some villages received more loans than in others and for 
longer periods of time, we also analyse the impact of treatment intensity over and above the 
basic impact of access to credit. We allow impact to vary by treatment intensity  at the 
village level, either measured as the average number of loans  or as the average 
number of months between the date when the first respondents in a village received a loan 
and the follow-up survey ( ): 
vInt
vNumber
vMonths
 
    ivtivtttvttvivt XFIntFGIntFIY   0876543210    (3) 
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where 3  and 6  give the additional effect of treatment intensity in individual-lending and 
group-lending villages, respectively. 
We measure treatment intensity at the village level to avoid endogeneity problems: more 
motivated and entrepreneurial individuals may make sure to get exposed to the lending 
programme early on, which would lead us to erroneously attribute the effect of these 
borrower characteristics to early treatment. We should stress that the intensity of the 
programme was not purposely varied in a random fashion among the treatment sample. One 
should therefore interpret with caution the results obtained estimating equation (3), as the 
intensity of the programme might vary with unobserved village and/or individual 
characteristics and induce biases in the estimation of the coefficients of this equation. Having 
said that, numerous conversations with XacBank officials make us believe that the variation 
in intensity of the programme across villages was by and large induced by administrative 
quirks and is unlikely to be endogenous. 
The mean number of months between the date when the first respondents in a village 
received a loan and the date of the follow-up survey is 5.2 months (6.3 months in group-
lending villages, 4.2 months in individual-lending villages) with a standard deviation of 2.7 
months. The mean number of loans received is 0.78 (0.99 in group-lending villages, 0.57 in 
individual-lending villages) with a standard deviation of 0.48. This means that not only is the 
probability of borrowing higher in group villages, but so also is the intensity of the treatment. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Loan use 
We first provide a picture of what borrowers reported having used their loans for. Table 5 
shows that women used the individual and group loans in very similar ways. Assuming that 
the purchase of livestock, tools and machinery are business expenses, we find that 67 (66) per 
cent of group (individual) borrowers used their first loan mainly to invest in a new or existing 
enterprise, putting between 70 and 80 per cent of the loan to this purpose, with the remainder 
being used for household expenses. In the case of second loans, fewer women – 43 (51) per 
cent of the group (individual) borrowers – used the loan primarily for business purposes. 
 
1 st  group loan 2 nd group loan 1 st group loan 2 nd  group loan
Other business expenses 0.57 0.37 0.89 0.78
Other household expenses 0.28 0.22 0.73 0.56
Mixed expenses 0.14 0.17 0.60 0.60
Education 0.06 0.06 0.74 0.54
Purchase tools/machinery 0.06 0.01 0.87 100
Purchase livestock 0.04 0.05 0.60 0.69
1 st individual loan 2 nd individual loan 1 st individual loan 2 nd individual loan
Other business expenses 0.51 0.47 0.82 0.83
Other household expenses 0.28 0.19 0.70 0.68
Mixed expenses 0.12 0.08 0.71 0.75
Education 0.08 0.07 0.65 0.53
Purchase tools/machinery 0.06 0.03 0.73 100
Purchase livestock 0.09 0.02 0.73 0.45
Percentage of borrowers that used part 
of the loan for this purpose
Percentage of loan amount when used 
for this purpose
This table presents an overview of how borrowers used their loans. Borrowers could state more than one type of loan
use. Source: Follow-up survey.
Table 5. Loan use
 
 
We can also compare what women reported as the purpose of the loan at baseline and at 
follow-up. When we do this, we find that 86 (93) per cent of group (individual) borrowers 
who at follow-up stated that they had used their loan(s) mainly for business purposes, had 
consistently indicated at the start of the experiment that they would use the loan for 
entrepreneurial activities. However, 82 per cent of women in both types of treatment villages 
who used the loan mainly for consumption had reported at baseline that they would use it to 
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invest in a business. We cannot say whether they intentionally misreported at baseline (as the 
loans were marketed as business loans) or whether they later changed their minds. 
5.2. Impact of the microcredit programmes 
A key objective of the microcredit programmes was to encourage women to expand or invest 
in small-scale enterprises, with the ultimate aim of reducing poverty and improving well-
being. To evaluate the extent to which the programme achieved these two objectives, we first 
look at the effect on enterprise creation and growth, and on whether enterprise profits 
increased. We then go on to estimate its effect on detailed household consumption, as a 
measure of well-being. To pre-empt, we find evidence of households in group villages 
increasing investment in enterprises, and corresponding increases in consumption. We detect 
no systematic effects in individual villages. 
5.2.1. Did the programmes affect business creation and growth? 
As discussed, one of the main intermediate objectives of the programmes was to encourage 
women to invest in new or existing small-scale enterprises. We have seen some suggestive 
evidence that this was the case, with a large majority of women reporting having used a 
substantial part of their loan(s) to invest in working capital and fixed assets. In this section we 
estimate the effect on business creation and growth. Table 6 shows estimates from equation 
(1) through (3). The odd (even) columns show the impacts for group (individual) loans. 
We first estimate the basic impact using equation (1), and then estimate heterogeneous 
impacts by education level (equation (2)) and treatment intensity (equation (3)). Treatment 
intensity is measured as the number of borrowing months or as the number of loans, and is in 
both cases the average at the village level. In line with equation (3) the intensity effects 
measure the impact of longer actual exposure to loans over and above the basic ITT effect. 
We use the same estimation approach for the other outcome variables. All regressions include 
a standard set of baseline respondent and village-level covariates (listed in Table A1 in the 
Annex) and our results remain robust to the exclusion of these covariates. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the impact of access to microcredit on the probability that the 
household operates a small-scale business, whether the respondent's own, her partner's, or 
their joint one (65 per cent of respondents are married or cohabitating). Columns (3) and (4) 
show similar regressions but specifically for the respondent's own enterprise. We see that 
access to group loans has a significant positive impact on female entrepreneurship and this 
effect is largely driven by less-educated women (see row II). At the end of the experiment, 
these women had a 29 per cent higher chance of operating a business compared with women 
in the control villages. This difference is 10 per cent for highly educated women.17 Rows III 
and IV show that a large part of these effects is driven by women who had been exposed to 
(repeat) loans for a longer period of time. 
 
G I G I G I G I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Base effect 0.080 ‐0.028 0.105* ‐0.018 ‐2,125 ‐8,169 ‐2,125 ‐24,569
(0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.060) (118,787) (89,233) (118,787) (40,061)
Base effect 0.284*** ‐0.001 0.289** ‐0.105 ‐277,351* ‐110,834 ‐88,405 ‐21,485
(0.090) (0.123) (0.141) (0.137) (161,751) (98,292) (80,372) (61,399)
High education ‐0.277** ‐0.031 ‐0.186* 0.106 316,773 122,015 80,882 ‐2,933
(0.124) (0.126) (0.110) (0.143) (221,398) (129,769) (113,427) (89,685)
Base effect 0.079 ‐0.029 0.103 ‐0.019 ‐7,658 ‐10,137 ‐20,514 ‐25,505
(0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) (118,932) (89,197) (55,142) (40,222)
Intensity: Months 0.007 0.021** 0.014** 0.017 41,503** 26,255*** 25,894*** 10,428***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (15,874) (9,629) (7,740) (3,539)
Base effect 0.008 ‐0.028 0.103 ‐0.019 ‐6,018 ‐10,028 ‐19,855 ‐25,325
(0.056) (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) (118,719) (89,031) (55,095) (40,130)
Intensity: Number 0.005 0.102 0.058* 0.010 201,679** 136,893* 135,560*** 24,564
(0.047) (0.103) (0.033) (0.126) (81,670) (75,678) (38,970) (46,477)
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,052 2,052 2,054 2,054
IV.
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences ITT regressions to measure the impact of group (G) and individual (I)
loans on business creation and growth. Base effect refers to the basic difference between the treatment and the control villages.
High education refers to an interaction term between a dummy for highly educated women and the base effect. Intensity: 
Months refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Months and the base effect. Intensity: Number refers to an
interaction term between intensity measure Number and the base effect. Regressions also include a standard set of unreported
pre-treatment covariates (see Table A1). The standard errors are clustered by village and reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
Probability of any type 
of business
Probability of female 
business
Profit of any businesses 
combined
Profit of female business
Table 6. Impact on business creation and growth
I.
II.
III.
 
 
The results for access to individual loans are less strong. Columns (2) and (4) indicate no 
impact on female entrepreneurship, although there is a positive impact on total 
entrepreneurship over time (row III). This latter effect is driven by joint enterprises which 
become more prevalent in individual-lending compared with control villages. In individual-
lending villages where respondents borrowed on average for six months, the probability that a 
household operates any type of business is 12 percentage points higher than in the control 
                                                           
17 This also translates into a higher likelihood of operating any type of enterprise (column (1)). Unreported 
regressions show that there is no strong impact of access to group loans on enterprise ownership by, or jointly 
with, the borrower's partner. The effect in column (1) is thus driven by an increase in female entrepreneurship. 
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villages. Interestingly, the nature of the businesses operated by women themselves and those 
operated jointly with their spouses differ. The former are mostly sewing businesses and 
small-scale retail activities whereas the latter comprise mainly animal husbandry and crop 
production. 
Chart 1 depicts how the actual loan exposure at the village level influences entrepreneurship 
(for a typical respondent with average covariate values). The left-hand (right-hand) panels 
show individual- (group)-lending villages. The upper panels focus on the likelihood that 
women run their own business, whereas the lower panels indicate the probability that 
households operate any kind of business. The starting point of each graph indicates the 
probability of business ownership for the average respondent in treatment villages where in 
practice virtually no XacBank lending took place. Due to the randomisation these values do 
not differ significantly between both types of treatment villages nor do they differ from the 
values in the control villages (where XacBank did not lend by design). The graphs then show 
similar point estimates, surrounded by a 95 per cent confidence interval, for the probability of 
business ownership in treatment villages where the actual average exposure was 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 
or 12 months. 
While in all four graphs the probability of business ownership increases with loan exposure, 
the confidence intervals are narrowest for female enterprises in group-lending villages and for 
all enterprises in individual-lending villages. For example, a typical respondent in a group-
lending village where respondents were only exposed to credit for a few days, had a 36 per 
cent probability of operating her own enterprise (the same as in a control village). A similar 
respondent in a group-lending village where respondents had been borrowing for a full 12 
months had a 53 per cent probability of running a business. This 53 per cent is outside the 95 
per cent interval surrounding the point estimate of 36 per cent for respondents in relatively 
less-treated villages. These results mirror those in Table 6: female enterprises became more 
prevalent in group-lending villages (compared with the control villages) whereas in 
individual-lending villages there was a gradual and significant increase in the number of 
businesses operated jointly by borrowers and their spouses. 
 
This chart shows the probability of enterprise ownership by an average respondent in the individual lending villages (left-hand side) and group-lending
villages (right-hand side) as a function of the number of months respondents in a village borrowed on average from XacBank. The top two graphs show
the probability of female-owned businesses whereas the two graphs at the bottom show the probability that the average household operates any type of
business (operated by the respondent, her spouse, or jointly). The blue lines indicate the expected probability while the white lines indicate a 95 per
cent confidence interval.
Chart 1. Treatment intensity and business creation
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Columns (5) to (8) in Table 6 analyse whether access to credit resulted in more profitable 
enterprises. Even though enterprise profitability decreased in both treatment and control 
villages between the baseline and follow-up surveys, mainly due to the economic crisis, 
access to credit seems to have partly shielded borrowers from this impact. Columns (5) and 
(7) show that over time and after repeat borrowing, enterprises in group-lending villages were 
significantly more profitable than those in control villages. After half a year of exposure to 
credit, the difference in yearly profitability amounts to over 200,000 tögrög, or almost one 
third of the average annual enterprise profits at baseline. We find a similar positive impact on 
business profits in individual-lending villages, although here again the impact is mainly due 
to enterprises that are operated jointly with the borrower's partner. 
Lastly, we look at whether households increased labour supply in line with this increased 
business creation. About a quarter of respondents were employed in wage activities at the 
time of the baseline interview and they received an average wage of MNT 130,000 (USD 
113) per month. During the experiment the share of wage employment remained unchanged 
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and there was a marked drop in salary levels, most likely due to the global crisis. We find no 
clear impact of the programmes on total labour supply or income at the household level, nor 
do we find an impact when we split labour supply into wage labour and hours worked in own 
enterprises (Table 7). There is weak evidence (at the 10 per cent significance level) that over 
time group borrowers work less for a wage, which would be in line with the increase in 
female self-employment. We do not find a significant impact on enterprise labour for these 
group borrowers though. In contrast, there is some evidence that households in individual-
lending villages start to work more in enterprises over time, in line with the evidence on 
gradual (joint) enterprise creation. Despite these impacts we do not find any significant effect 
on overall household income (or on wage income and income from benefits separately). 
 
G I G I G I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base effect ‐4.914 8.409 6.135 ‐8.472 ‐110,788 ‐131,659
(9.775) (10.03) (12.98) (13.99) (204,082) (209,531)
Base effect ‐45.090 0.037 21.23 ‐24.68 ‐224,480 91,786
(28.950) (25.24) (37.24) (33.18) (224,003) (229,403)
High education 44.180 9.591 ‐16.80 18.83 146,491 ‐252,523
(27.360) (26.25) (37.55) (32.99) (288,917) (307,018)
Base effect ‐4.402 8.416 5.949 ‐8.495 ‐115,802 ‐133,925
(9.717) (10.04) (12.99) (13.94) (203,265) (210,005)
Intensity: Months ‐2.166* ‐0.019 1.207 5.708*** 45,995 24,518
(1.217) (3.278) (1.626) (1.580) (33,618) (33,512)
Base effect ‐4.637 8.406 6.266 ‐8.463 ‐111,418 ‐134,153
(9.706) (10.01) (13.05) (13.96) (203,382) (209,871)
Intensity: Number ‐7.353 8.605 ‐2.213 38.18** 187,612 186,060
(6.864) (29.83) (12.17) (16.40) (197,646) (265,296)
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,007 2,007
II.
III.
IV.
Table 7. Impact on labour supply and income
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences ITT regressions to measure the impact of group
(G) and individual (I) loans on labour supply and income. Base effect refers to the basic difference between
the treatment and the control villages. High education refers to an interaction term between a dummy for
highly educated women and the base effect. Intensity: Months refers to an interaction term between
intensity measure Months and the base effect. Intensity: Number refers to an interaction term between
intensity measure Number and the base effect. Regressions also include a standard set of unreported pre-
treatment covariates (see Table A1). The standard errors are clustered by village and reported in brackets.
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table A1 provides the definitions and
sources of all variables.
Hours of wage labour by 
HH in average week
Hours of enterprise 
labour by HH in average 
week
Total household income
I.
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5.2.2. Did household well-being increase? The impact on consumption and asset ownership 
In order to assess whether borrowers' increased engagement in entrepreneurial activities fed 
through to improving household well-being – a key objective of the programme – we next 
estimate the effects of the programme on household consumption. We use detailed 
information on consumption patterns elicited in the surveys, in which food consumption is 
measured over the past week (at a disaggregate level as well as overall), and non-durable and 
durable consumption over the past month and year, respectively. 
Interestingly, we find robust evidence that access to group loans led to more and healthier 
food consumption, in particular of fresh items such as fruit, vegetables and dairy products 
(Table 8). With the exception of dairy these effects are not only due to increased home 
production: we also see treated clients purchasing more. The probability that a household 
consumed dairy products, fruit and vegetables, and non-alcoholic drinks in the last week was 
5, 10 and 13 percentage points higher in group-lending than control villages. Total food 
consumption was 17 percentage points higher. To put this into context, the average loan per 
borrower in group-lending villages is USD 300 and the average monthly pre-treatment food 
consumption in group-lending (and control) villages was USD 108 per household. So the 
estimated effect implies that over time food consumption increased by USD 19 more per 
household in group villages, that is, 6.3 per cent of the loan amount. Over time we also see an 
increase in the use of combustibles and additional felt for ger isolation as well as other non-
durable and total consumption. In line with Banerjee et al. (2010) we find a negative impact 
on the probability of smoking and the amount spent on cigarettes, a typical temptation good. 
In contrast to households in group-lending villages, households in individual-lending villages 
do not experience much change in their consumption as a result of access to credit. We do not 
find any effects on aggregate consumption and expenditure variables – not even with 
increased exposure to treatment. 
 
Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
G I G I G I G I G G I I G G I I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Base effect 0.116 0.0347 0.173** 0.0183 0.0113 ‐0.00283 ‐0.0974 ‐0.0570 0.047** 22,031 0.0474*** ‐1,235 0.0960* 1,112* 0.0764 803.0
(0.0805) (0.0759) (0.0712) (0.0668) (0.157) (0.144) (0.118) (0.121) (0.0189) (18,544) (0.0170) (2,532) (0.0570) (634.8) (0.0545) (497.5)
Base effect 0.276 0.230 0.444* 0.367* 0.119 ‐0.137 ‐0.550* ‐0.385 0.0603 28,877 0.0829*** 10,932 0.142 1,192 0.132 1,276
(0.238) (0.204) (0.220) (0.204) (0.393) (0.396) (0.326) (0.246) (0.0414) (20,562) (0.0288) (9,215) (0.101) (1,156) (0.0952) (875.3)
High education ‐0.185 ‐0.227 ‐0.317 ‐0.407* ‐0.116 0.156 0.530 0.389 ‐0.0336 ‐7,922 ‐0.101 ‐14,020 ‐0.0838 ‐84.42 ‐0.0873 ‐541.0
(0.272) (0.246) (0.239) (0.229) (0.425) (0.418) (0.332) (0.235) (0.0973) (13,378) (0.109) (10,913) (0.160) (1,084) (0.149) (908.2)
Base effect 0.110 0.0339 0.166** 0.0163 0.00297 ‐0.00253 ‐0.102 ‐0.0571 0.0462** 21,295 0.0473*** ‐1,361 0.0975* 1,100* 0.0779 801.8
(0.0800) (0.0759) (0.0703) (0.0667) (0.158) (0.144) (0.119) (0.121) (0.0184) (18,263) (0.0158) (2,508) (0.0565) (632.6) (0.0542) (497.4)
Intensity: Months 0.049*** ‐0.00146 0.055*** 0.0193 0.037** ‐0.0184 0.035 ‐0.0114 0.0145*** 7,110 ‐0.0160 ‐74.49 ‐0.0108 62.43 0.0227** 108.6
(0.0128) (0.0180) (0.0160) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0255) (0.0225) (0.0335) (0.00475) (4,535) (0.0146) (1,518) (0.00881) (53.30) (0.0113) (105.8)
Base effect 0.111 0.0335 0.166** 0.0163 0.0075 ‐0.00287 ‐0.0992 ‐0.0569 0.0472** 21,137 0.0471*** ‐1,528 0.0966* 1,102* 0.0784 801.5
(0.0802) (0.0762) (0.0707) (0.0671) (0.158) (0.144) (0.119) (0.121) (0.0183) (18,353) (0.0155) (2,562) (0.0568) (633.5) (0.0541) (496.5)
Intensity: Number 0.272*** 0.00143 0.359*** 0.0581 0.123 ‐0.0816 0.0910 ‐0.0649 0.0790*** 56,965* ‐0.147 1,420 ‐0.0362 330.8 0.176* 1,061
(0.0689) (0.160) (0.0907) (0.194) (0.102) (0.186) (0.141) (0.233) (0.0206) (31,544) (0.115) (15,570) (0.0419) (311.9) (0.0944) (726.6)
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,050 2,050 1,993 1,993 2,048 2,048 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034
Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Probit
G G I I G G I I G G I I G I
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (31)
Base effect 0.125** 1,426** 0.0700 786.6 0.0221* ‐264.1 0.00442 6,015 ‐0.0681* ‐2,644** ‐0.0630 ‐943.5 ‐0.00483 ‐0.00452
(0.0583) (557.3) (0.0604) (555.0) (0.0115) (6,867) (0.0224) (7,474) (0.0348) (1,043) (0.0440) (957.0) (0.0100) (0.00903)
Base effect ‐0.0196 ‐272.2 0.0844 995.2 ‐0.554** 11,140 0.000597 3,182 ‐0.0635 ‐3,685* ‐0.0474 ‐658.3 0.972*** 0.966***
(0.178) (1,885) (0.173) (1,562) (0.256) (26,035) (0.00362) (26,611) (0.0963) (1,927) (0.110) (2,496) (0.0472) (0.0271)
High education 0.163 1,867 ‐0.0146 ‐246.9 0.0222 ‐13,059 ‐0.00582 3,420 ‐0.00969 1,164 ‐0.0204 ‐270.9 ‐0.0327*** ‐0.0331***
(0.230) (2,094) (0.188) (1,849) (0.0912) (26,517) (0.0281) (26,692) (0.105) (2,150) (0.106) (2,580) (0.0101) (0.00656)
Base effect 0.122** 1,393** 0.0704 788.6 0.0159* ‐848.3 0.00346 5,961 ‐0.0678* ‐2,629** ‐0.0621 ‐902.2 ‐0.00364 ‐0.00400
(0.0580) (560.1) (0.0604) (554.7) (0.00913) (6,839) (0.0179) (7,450) (0.0350) (1,059) (0.0436) (960.0) (0.00934) (0.00750)
Intensity: Months 0.00839 129.2* ‐0.0114 ‐79.40 0.00728** 2,735*** ‐0.00120 ‐944.3 ‐0.00528 ‐270.0 ‐0.0125 ‐337.7 0.00337*** 0.00155
(0.00752) (70.16) (0.00890) (117.5) (0.00321) (1,003) (0.00170) (1,074) (0.00688) (290.2) (0.0197) (492.2) (0.000812) (0.00141)
Base effect 0.123** 1,397** 0.0708 787.9 0.0191* ‐574.0 0.00385 5,966 ‐0.0677* ‐2,636** ‐0.0625 ‐917.6 ‐0.00361 ‐0.00412
(0.0581) (560.0) (0.0604) (555.0) (0.0105) (6,839) (0.0200) (7,456) (0.0348) (1,051) (0.0436) (964.8) (0.00966) (0.00783)
Intensity: Number 0.0363 588.8 ‐0.0991 ‐643.2 0.0282** 10,244** ‐0.00990 ‐3,635 ‐0.0265 ‐1,163 ‐0.0412 ‐1,523 0.0166*** ‐0.00238
(0.0399) (389.9) (0.0628) (882.8) (0.0143) (5,029) (0.0162) (8,240) (0.0339) (1,425) (0.174) (4,238) (0.00437) (0.0128)
Observations 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034 2,034
Non‐durable (log)
Combustibles
I.
II.
IV.
Non‐alcoholic drinks
IV.
I.
II.
III.
III.
Felt for ger
Table 8. Impact on consumption
Total (log) Food (log) Durable (log) Dairy Fruit and vegetables
Cigarettes
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences ITT regressions to measure the impact of group (G) and individual (I) loans on consumption. Food consumption refers to past week, non-durable expenditure to past month, and durable expenditure to past
year. Base effect refers to the basic difference between the treatment and the control villages. High education refers to an interaction term between a dummy for highly educated women and the base effect. Intensity: Months refers to an interaction term between
intensity measure Months and the base effect. Intensity: Number refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Number and the base effect. Regressions also include a standard set of unreported pre-treatment covariates (see Table A1). Standard errors are
clustered by village and reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
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18 
18 We do not find a significant increase in the total number of animals as measured by the number of 
standardised Mongolian livestock units or bod (one horse, yak or cattle equals one bod; one camel equals 1.4 
bod; one sheep equals 1/6 bod; and one goat equals 1/7 bod). 
G I G I G I G I G I G I G I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Base effect ‐129,482 ‐325,163 0.001 0.071 0.009 0.064 ‐0.017 ‐0.105 0.062 0.018 0.172*** 0.137** ‐0.022 ‐0.001
(527,000) (542,918) (0.072) (0.071) (0.05) (0.042) (0.125) (0.113) (0.050) (0.046) (0.054) (0.054) (0.022) (0.014)
Base effect ‐1,148,000 ‐905,922 ‐0.057 0.148 ‐2.08*** 0.072 ‐0.335*** ‐0.124 ‐0.297*** ‐0.237*** 0.169 0.192* ‐0.005 ‐0.010
(1,188,000) (831,094) (0.134) (0.115) (0.0611) (0.122) (0.113) (0.151) (0.065) (0.083) (0.143) (0.107) (0.036) (0.037)
High education 922,123 357,832 0.069 ‐0.080 0.406** ‐0.006 0.307** 0.023 0.516*** 0.360** 0.004 ‐0.062 ‐0.012 0.012
(1,367,000) (1,019,000) (0.142) (0.105) (0.178) (0.106) (0.131) (0.157) (0.118) (0.146) (0.161) (0.140) (0.054) (0.041)
Base effect ‐164,484 ‐331,615 0.005 0.072 0.008 0.062 ‐0.120 ‐0.110 0.0613 0.017 0.171*** 0.136** ‐0.020 ‐0.001
(520,573) (539,958) (0.074) (0.072) (0.035) (0.042) (0.124) (0.113) (0.05) (0.046) (0.054) (0.055) (0.021) (0.014)
Intensity: Months 264,751** 31,276 ‐0.03*** ‐0.03*** 0.02*** 0.022** 0.02*** 0.045*** 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.024* ‐0.003 0.011***
(103,886) (202,940) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.0170) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003)
Base effect ‐147,759 ‐335,491 0.004 0.072 0.07 0.063 ‐0.118 ‐0.111 0.062 0.018 0.172*** 0.135*** ‐0.021 ‐0.001
(522,313) (540,709) (0.073) (0.072) (0.035) (0.042) (0.124) (0.113) (0.05) (0.046) (0.054) (0.055) (0.021) (0.014)
Intensity: Number 987,927* 880,953 ‐0.15*** ‐0.185** 0.081** 0.047 0.087** 0.399*** ‐0.03 0.043 0.010 0.173* ‐0.070 0.098***
(574,456) (1,440,000) (0.036) (0.088) (0.032) (0.101) (0.042) (0.112) (0.06) (0.171) (0.088) (0.094) (0.014) (0.026)
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055
G I G I G I G I G I G I
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26)
Base effect 0.085** 0.070* 0.060 0.161 0.011 ‐0.090 0.039 0.017 ‐0.601 ‐1.884* ‐1.330 0.956
(0.036) (0.041) (0.113) (0.109) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (1.255) (1.083) (1.126) (1.362)
Base effect ‐0.048 ‐0.180 0.306** 0.366*** 0.037 ‐0.037 ‐0.106 ‐0.131* ‐3.356 ‐3.827 0.420 1.234
(0.139) (0.126) (0.132) (0.135) (0.178) (0.153) (0.116) (0.074) (2.467) (2.509) (2.085) (2.170)
High education 0.147 0.258** ‐0.313* ‐0.290* ‐0.027 0.021 0.166 0.174** 3.135 2.237 ‐2.542 ‐0.410
(0.131) (0.105) (0.160) (0.158) (0.159) (0.170) (0.127) (0.083) (2.621) (2.644) (2.400) (2.264)
Base effect 0.084** 0.070* 0.059 0.161 0.010 ‐0.020 0.034 0.016 ‐0.822 ‐1.876* ‐1.330 0.956
(0.037) (0.041) (0.112) (0.109) (0.043) (0.046) (0.044) (0.043) (1.264) (1.067) (1.127) (1.362)
Intensity: Months 0.013 0.020 ‐0.01 0.027** 0.012** 0.014 0.036*** 0.014 1.268*** 0.127 0.139 0.651
(0.014) (0.019) (0.01) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.262) (0.067) (0.685) (0.711)
Base effect 0.084** 0.069* 0.058 0.161 0.010 ‐0.019 0.036 0.015 ‐0.777 ‐1.871* ‐1.330 0.956
(0.036) (0.041) (0.113) (0.109) (0.04) (0.046) (0044) (0.043) (1.256) (1.064) (1.127) (1.362)
Intensity: Number 0.027 0.210 ‐0.078 0.207* 0.064** 0.120 0.143*** 0.151* 6.047*** 0.233 4.952 2.393
(0.073) (0.146) (0.050) (0.111) (0.029) (0.103) (0.041) (0.089) (1.746) (4.787) (6.422) (3.529)
Observations 2,055 2,055 2,053 2,053 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,055 2,051 2,051 1,874 1,874
IV.
Number of animals (in bod)Number of cattleProbability large household 
appliances
Probability riding 
equipment
II.
III.
Probability unsold stock and 
raw materials
Probability tools
I.
Table 9. Impact on asset ownership
I.
II.
Value of all assets (incl. 
main dwelling)
Probability 2nd house
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences ITT regressions to measure the impact of group (G) and individual (I) loans on asset ownership. Base effect refers to the basic difference between the treatment and the control
villages. High education refers to an interaction term between a dummy for highly educated women and the base effect. Intensity: Months refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Months and the base effect. Intensity: 
Number refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Number and the base effect. Bod are standardized Mongolian livestock units. One horse, yak, or cattle equals one bod; one camel equals 1.4 bod; one sheep equals 1/6 bod;
and one goat equals 1/7 bod. Regressions also include a standard set of unreported pre-treatment covariates (see Table A1). The standard errors are clustered by village and reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
Probability television
IV.
Probability VCR or radioProbability 2nd ger Probability land/well
III.
Probability vehicle
 
 
32
 
 
33
We find fairly sim
houses and an increase in the ownership of land and second  
rela
also of televisions (over tim  
in the indiv
that we docu
5.2.3. Do the programmes crowd out transfers? 
The results just shown paint a different pictur
individu
achiev
transfers are affected by the programmes, and wh
and individual villages: as in  
from
Office, 2006). Kinship and social 
as they derive f
nom
(Enkham
share in
Access to form
different ways. On the one hand,  
villages m
shared. On the other hand, inform
for
recip
The survey asked households about their informal
friends and fa
an overall ITT effect of eith  
over tim
(see Tab
 
ilar results for individual-lending villages: over time a reduction in second 
gers. We also find an increase,
tive to control villages, in the ownership of VCRs/radios, large household appliances and 
e). Lastly, there was a gradual increase in the ownership of tools
idual-lending villages, in line with the increase in the (general) business activity 
ment for these villages in Table 6 and Chart 1. 
e of the impact of the programme in group and 
al villages, with evidence that the group loans were relatively more effective at 
ing their objectives. One interesting question is the extent to which interpersonal 
ether they are affected differently in group 
 many developing countries, access to informal credit/transfers
 friends and family is important in Mongolia, in particular for women (National Statistics 
networks are confined to relatively small groups of people 
rom the traditional khot ail support system in which a small number of 
adic households travelled, camped and herded together for one or more seasons 
galen, 1995). Within khot ail and similar social networks rural Mongolians often 
come from entrepreneurial activities as well as pensions and other allowances. 
al credit may have changed informal lending and transfer behaviour in two 
the increased availability of formal credit in treatment
ay have strengthened informal support networks as additional funds could be 
al networks may have weakened as borrowers substitute 
mal for informal credit, thereby crowding out insurance systems based on implicit 
rocal agreements. 
 – monetary and in-kind – transactions with 
mily during the past year and the most recent month. Although we do not find 
er lending programme on informal transfers, we document that
e group borrowers received fewer transfers both from friends and family members 
le 10). 
G I G I G I G I G I G I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Base effect 0.0454 ‐0.00322 ‐0.0216 0.0210 ‐0.0201 0.0389 ‐0.00984 0.115 ‐0.0364 ‐0.000815 ‐0.0367 0.0244
(0.0499) (0.0369) (0.0526) (0.0566) (0.0644) (0.0594) (0.0599) (0.0704) (0.0447) (0.0451) (0.0444) (0.0624)
Base effect 0.0537 ‐0.0369 ‐0.0683 ‐0.0698 0.144 ‐0.0973 0.190 0.184 0.138 ‐0.0746 0.0269 0.0487
(0.0944) (0.0553) (0.0784) (0.0549) (0.130) (0.0930) (0.130) (0.170) (0.154) (0.0664) (0.218) (0.195)
High education ‐0.00794 0.0462 0.0710 0.134 ‐0.155 0.174* ‐0.213 ‐0.0832 ‐0.125** 0.109 ‐0.0593 ‐0.0266
(0.0715) (0.0895) (0.0996) (0.106) (0.101) (0.0943) (0.132) (0.160) (0.0605) (0.111) (0.198) (0.166)
Base effect 0.0491 ‐0.00222 ‐0.0194 0.0213 ‐0.0133 0.0389 ‐0.00680 0.115 ‐0.0329 ‐0.000895 ‐0.0348 0.0241
‐0.0509 ‐0.0366 ‐0.0527 ‐0.0561 (0.0647) (0.0592) (0.0594) (0.0706) (0.0447) (0.0445) (0.0443) (0.0623)
Intensity: Months ‐0.0102*** 0.00706 ‐0.0155*** 0.0146** ‐0.0256*** 0.00866 ‐0.0156 0.0140 ‐0.0126*** 0.0141*** ‐0.00854* 0.0264***
‐0.00253 ‐0.00433 ‐0.0059 ‐0.00736 (0.00683) (0.00762) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.00399) (0.00486) (0.00499) (0.00937)
Base effect 0.0491 ‐0.00186 ‐0.0194 0.0217 ‐0.0137 0.0390 ‐0.00788 0.115 ‐0.0336 ‐0.00103 ‐0.0358 0.0239
(0.0511) (0.0367) (0.0526) (0.0558) (0.0646) (0.0591) (0.0597) (0.0706) (0.0444) (0.0447) (0.0443) (0.0624)
Intensity: Number ‐0.0585*** 0.0973** ‐0.101*** 0.166*** ‐0.136*** 0.0805 ‐0.0718 0.126* ‐0.0582** 0.0828* ‐0.0271 0.179***
(0.0128) (0.0413) (0.0337) (0.0606) (0.0355) (0.0646) (0.0642) (0.0762) (0.0230) (0.0494) (0.0293) (0.0657)
Observations 2,054 2,054 2,055 2,055 2,054 2,054 2,055 2,055 2,054 2,054 2,055 2,055
Table 10. Impact on informal transfers
Probability of making 
transfers to family  during 
the last year
Probability of receiving 
transfers from family 
during the last year
I.
Probability of receiving 
transfers from family 
during the last month
Probability of making 
transfers to family 
during the last month
This table presents the results of difference-in-differences ITT regressions to measure the impact of group (G) and individual (I) loans on informal transfers to and from family and friends. Base effect
refers to the basic difference between the treatment and the control villages. High education refers to an interaction term between a dummy for highly educated women and the base effect. Intensity: 
Months refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Months and the base effect. Intensity: Number refers to an interaction term between intensity measure Number and the base effect.
Regressions also include a standard set of unreported pre-treatment covariates (see Table A1). Standard errors are clustered by village and reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10-level.  Table A1 provides the definitions and sources of all variables.
III.
IV.
Probability of receiving 
transfers from friends 
during the last year
Probability of making 
transfers to friends  during 
the last year
II.
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Chart 2a. Treatment intensity and informal transfers in group-lending villages
This chart shows the probability of receiving or giving informal transfers for an a
number of months respondents borrowed on average from XacBank. The top tw
transfers to and from friends, while the bottom two graphs show the same for
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Chart 2b. Treatment intensity and informal transfers in individual-lending villages
This chart shows the probability of receiving or giving informal transfers for an average respondent in the individual-lending villages as a function of the
number of months respondents borrowed on average from XacBank. The top two graphs show the probability of giving (left) and receiving (right)
transfers to and from friends, while the bottom two graphs show the same for transfers to and from family members. The blue lines indicate the expected
probability while the white lines indicate a 95 per cent confidence interval.
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These results may indicate that group borrowers partly substitute their informal networks 
with the formal network of the borrowing group. The associated discipline may make them 
less amenable to use part of their loans to help friends and family smooth consumption. In 
contrast, individual borrowers increase their informal financial transactions with friends and 
family, perhaps using part of their new loan to help others out.  
Such an interpretation would be in line with recent evidence for Sri Lanka and Ghana by De 
Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2009) and Fafchamps, McKenzie, Quinn and Woodruff 
(2011), respectively. The latter paper finds that women who received cash transfers did not 
increase their business profits as large portions of the cash grants ended up in household 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, transfers to others. Self-control problems, that is, 
borrowers' inability to commit themselves to invest large parts of the cash grants into their 
enterprises and to resist the temptation to spend money on competing demands, including 
from friends and family, were a core explanation for the ineffectiveness of cash grants. Our 
results are also in line with Karlan and Zinman (2011) who find that individual-liability loans 
may increase access to informal credit from friends and family in the case of emergencies. 
Lastly, our finding that cigarette consumption increased far less in group-lending villages 
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than in control villages, may reflect similar mechanisms. Just like group discipline can reduce 
the temptation to pass on part of the new loan to friends and family, it may also reduce 
spending on temptation goods (see also Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010). 
5.3. Repayment 
In the preceding sections we documented a positive impact of access to group loans on 
consumption and business activities as well as some weaker effects of access to individual 
loans on business activity. In this section, we analyse the repayment behaviour of both types 
of borrowers. Giné and Karlan (2010) also compare repayment rates between group and 
individual lending programmes – both with mandatory weekly repayment meetings – and 
find no significant differences. In contrast, Carpena, Vole, Shapiro and Zia (2010) find that 
joint liability is associated with better loan repayment. 
To construct our repayment data we use monthly reporting files that XacBank compiled on 
the basis of its administrative software. These files contain for each borrower the loan 
amount, interest rate, disbursement and due dates, loan purpose, collateral, overdue principal 
and interest, paid penalties as well as whether the client defaulted on the loan (defined as 
customers that were at least 90 days late in repaying one or more loan instalments). Table 11 
presents probit regressions to explain the probability of loan default. The dependent variable 
is a dummy that indicates whether a borrower defaulted (“1”) or not (“0”). The first two 
columns are based on a sample of first-time XacBank loans whereas the third and fourth 
columns are based on the full sample that includes repeat loans. 
We find, regardless of whether we control for borrower and loan characteristics, no 
difference between the probability of default in group-lending and individual-lending 
villages. This confirms the findings of Giné and Karlan (2010) although in our case neither 
loan programme included mandatory repayment meetings whereas in their experiment both 
programmes included such meetings. 
The covariates in columns (2) and (4) give additional information on the borrower and loan 
characteristics that influence default probability. While the size of the loan does not influence 
the likelihood of repayment, there is a negative impact (at the 10 per cent significance level) 
of the amount of outstanding debt at the time of the baseline survey. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group loan 0.029 ‐0.144 0.289 0.387
(0.398) (0.144) (0.339) (0.360)
Loan amount ‐0.790 0.444
(0.636) (0.584)
Debt at baseline ‐0.200* ‐0.200*
(0.140) (0.117)
No. prior loans with XacBank ‐0.161***
(0.040)
Months since disbursement 0.096*** 0.109***
(0.024) (0.021)
Owns land ‐0.590*** ‐0.263
(0.222) (0.208)
Owns TV 1.262** 0.152
(0.643) (0.318)
Owns enterprise ‐0.403* ‐0.093
(0.221) (0.153)
Grade VIII education ‐0.868*** ‐0.370*
(0.297) (0.218)
Vocational education ‐0.809*** ‐0.359
(0.325) (0.225)
Age ‐0.088 ‐0.023
(0.090) (0.066)
Age squared 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Buddhist 0.465 0.178
(0.390) (0.262)
Hahl ‐0.763** ‐0.707**
(0.377) (0.329)
Married 0.192 0.034
(0.266) (0.188)
Natural disaster 0.752* 0.300
(0.404) (0.277)
Observations 327 302 638 612
Pseudo R‐squared 0.009 0.321 0.009 0.29
Table 11. Determinants of loan default
This table presents probit regressions to explain loan default. The dependent
variable is a dummy that indicates whether a borrower defaulted (1) or not (0). Loan 
amount and Debt at baseline are measured in millions of tögrög. The following
additional covariates were included but are now shown (all insignificant):
Household size , Collateral value , Male HH members >16 , Female HH members
>16 , Children <16 , Owns fence , House or flat , Owns vehicle , Saver , HH crop
disaster , HH death . Standard errors are clustered by village and reported in
brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Table A1
provides the definitions and sources of all variables. Source of repayment data:
XacBank.
First loan All loans
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Respondents with outstanding debt at baseline where thus more likely to (be able to) repay 
the subsequent XacBank loan. Borrowers that had already successfully passed the screening 
of another bank, where less risky compared to first-time borrowers.19 
In addition, column (4) indicates that repeat borrowers were significantly less risky, possibly 
because they had already successfully passed XacBank's own screening procedures and 
subsequently paid on time. For both first-time and repeat loans we also find that as loans 
mature (increasing number of months since disbursement) the risk of default increases, all 
else equal (see also Carpena et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, a number of covariates are only of importance for first-time loans. Those that 
owned land or operated an enterprise at baseline were less risky borrowers as were the 
relatively highly educated. Ownership of a TV at baseline increased the risk of default, 
perhaps because this identifies women who use(d) debt for consumptive purposes. None of 
these variables is statistically significant at the 5 per cent level in the regression based on the 
whole loan sample (column 4). For repeat borrowers these variables are less important 
compared with the information that is contained in the variable that measures the number of 
successful previous loans with XacBank during the experiment. 
Lastly, in unreported regressions we look at interaction effects between the liability structure 
and the number of previous loans of the borrower. We find no evidence for such a 
differentiated impact of repeat borrowing under the two programmes. We also try other 
interaction terms but none of these is statistically significant, implying that there is no 
apparent heterogeneity between group and individual borrowers in terms of their repayment 
behaviour. 
 
19 To the extent that multiple borrowing and overindebtedness were a problem in rural Mongolia this is not 
picked up by our default analysis. The fact that we do not find differences in repayment rates does not imply, 
however, that borrowers with initial debt did not experience any difficulties; it just shows that in the end they 
managed to repay as well as first-time borrowers. High repayment rates can point to successful projects with 
high returns but may also mask underlying problems where borrowers need to borrow from other sources or sell 
assets in order to be able to repay. 
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6. Conclusion 
We present results from a randomised field experiment in rural Mongolia where group-
lending and individual-lending programmes were randomly introduced across villages. The 
aim of the study was to measure and compare the effectiveness of these two types of 
microcredit in reducing poverty – a topic that still lacks unequivocal evidence, in particular 
for rural settings. While earlier papers have separately assessed the poverty impact of group 
lending (Banerjee et al., 2010) and individual lending (Karlan and Zinman, 2011) this is the 
first field experiment to compare both in the same (rural) setting. 
Our findings on the poverty impact of different modes of microcredit are mixed. In line with 
previous studies, we document that participants in both programmes used part of their loans 
to acquire assets – VCRs, radios and large household appliances. A second finding that holds 
for both treatment programmes is that women with lower education seem to benefit more 
from the intervention than women with higher education. We interpret the level of education 
as a proxy poverty measure, more reliable than a wealth indicator given that it is not affected 
by the programme and is more stable over time. The results therefore suggest that it is the 
poorer part of the targeted population that benefits more from the microcredit intervention, 
independent of how it is being delivered. 
For group loans we also find a positive impact on food consumption and entrepreneurship 
though not on current income. Enterprise profits increase over time as well. Among 
households that were offered group loans the likelihood of owning an enterprise increases by 
10 percentage points more than in control villages (and even close to 30 percentage points for 
less-educated women). 
Our findings for individual lending are weaker. We find no significant increase in 
consumption or income although over time there is an increase in the probability that women 
operate a business jointly with their spouse. Over time these joint enterprises, which engage 
in different types of activities compared with the female-operated enterprises in group-
lending villages, also become more profitable. 
More generally, we find that effects observed for group borrowers are also experienced by 
women in individual-lending villages if they are exposed to credit for longer periods of time. 
For example, their likelihood of starting a business is higher the longer they have access to 
loans. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether these longer-term effects will translate in the same 
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way as they do for group clients. For example, we find no evidence that food consumption 
goes up with exposure in individual-lending villages. 
Importantly, we find no difference in repayment rates between the two lending programmes, 
both of which did not include weekly repayment meetings. This casts doubt on the hypothesis 
that microcredit repayment rates are high mainly due to the effect of weekly group meetings. 
Our results indicate that, at least in our context, even without such regular meetings group 
and individual microcredit can have similar and high repayment rates (also note that both our 
loan products required some form of collateral). 
There is at this stage no evidence on changes in income as a result of either of the 
programmes, though it may be too early for such effects to be observed. The more sustained 
and more generalised increase in consumption (of both non-durable consumption and the 
service of durable items) in group-lending villages seems to indicate that these loans are more 
effective at increasing the permanent income of households. It would be interesting to test 
this hypothesis further by considering long-run income levels.20 
If one were to take at face value the evidence on the stronger impact of group loans, one 
would want to ask why such loans are more effective at raising consumption (and probably 
long-term income) than individual loans. One possibility is that the joint-liability scheme 
better ensures discipline so that larger long-run effects can be achieved.21 Group discipline 
may not only prevent the selection of overly risky investment projects, it may also ensure that 
a substantial part of the loans is actually invested in the first place (instead of used for 
consumption or transfers to others). 
Our results on informal transfers can be interpreted to support this hypothesis: we find that 
women in group-lending villages decrease their transfer activities with families and friends, 
opposite to what we find in individual-lending villages. This could reflect that groups replace 
some of their informal financial networks but further analysis is needed to explore this. Such 
an analysis would also be important to assess the welfare impact of access to group loans for 
the borrowers as well as their friends and families. Increased within-group financial 
20 There might also be a measurement issue. In developing countries income is notoriously harder to measure 
than consumption and might be more affected by measurement error, therefore making the detection of 
relatively small impacts harder. 
21 The savings requirement of the group product may also have helped to select disciplined borrowers. 
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discipline may come at the cost of disrupting informal credit and insurance systems based on 
kinship and other social ties. 
Lastly, to some extent our weaker results for individual loans may also reflect that borrowing 
at baseline was somewhat higher in individual-lending villages compared with group-lending 
villages. Moreover, since group-lending was an innovative way of lending in the Mongolian 
context, the unmet demand for such a product – and consequently its marginal impact – may 
have been higher. Loan take-up was indeed higher in group-lending villages. This could 
indicate that some women, in particular the less-educated, had not been comfortable with 
borrowing on an individual basis but were willing to borrow within the framework of a 
group. This would imply that group and individual lending are complementary financial 
services for which the demand may differ across borrower types. The continuing process of 
liability individualisation by MFIs may therefore run the risk that certain borrowers, those 
that are not able or willing to borrow and invest on their own, may gradually lose access to 
formal financial services. 
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Annex 
Chart A1.  Overview of participating villages and provinces
This chart shows the geographical location of the 10 control soum centers (villages) as black dots, the 15 individual-lending villages (grey dots), and the 15 group-lending 
villages (white dots) across the five Mongolian provinces that participated in the experiment.
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Description
Respondent and household (HH) level data (# respondents = 1,148). Source: Baseline survey
Age Age in years of respondent X
Age squared Age in years of respondent squared X
Amount female business Loan amount (in 000's MNT) that is used for a female‐owned business
At least one loan Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH had at least one loan outstanding
Buddhist Respondent is of the Buddhist religion X
Children <16 Number of children in the HH younger than 16 years X
Collateral value Estimated market value of the collateral (in 000's MNT)
Consumption fuel Quantity of fuel burned by the HH in the past week (in litres)
Consumption milk Quantity of milk consumed by the HH in the past week (in litres)
Consumption red meat Quantity of red meat consumed by the HH in the past week (in kilograms)
Consumption vegetables Quantity of vegetables consumed by the HH in the past week (in kilograms)
Debt at baseline Amount of loans outstanding at time of baseline survey (in million MNT)
Debt service Loan+interest (re)payment at HH level over past month (in 000's MNT) conditional on at least one loan outstanding
Debt value Amount of debt (in million MNT) at HH level that is still outstanding conditional on at least one loan outstanding
Debt/HH income Outstanding debt amount as proportion of annual HH income conditional on at least one loan outstanding
Education respondent Number of years of education of the respondent
Education high Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent completed grade VIII or higher or vocational
Education >VIII Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent completed grade VIII or higher X
Education vocational Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent completed vocational training X
Female business Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent operates her own business conditional on at least one HH business
Female HH members >16 Number of female HH members aged 16 or older X
Given transfers Value of monetary and in‐kind transfers given in last 12 months from non‐relatives (in 000's MNT) conditional on giving
Hahl Respondent ethnicity is Hahl X
HH crop disaster Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH experienced severe crop losses during the previous year
HH death Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH experienced death of a HH member in the previous year
HH robbery Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH experienced a robbery in the previous year
Highly educated Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent has completed vocational training or grade VIII or above
Hours hired Average number of hours worked per week in peak season by non‐HH members in the respondent's enterprise
Household size Number of children and adults in the household
House or flat HH lives in a house, flat or apartment rather than a ger
Interest rate Monthly interest rate on a loan
Joint enterprise Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent operates an enterprise together with her spouse
Male HH members >16 Number of male HH members aged 16 or older X
Married Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent is married or living together with partner X
Loans at baseline Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH had at least one loan outstanding at the time of the baseline interview X
Operates business Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH operates at least one business
Outstanding loans Number of loans taken by the HH that are still outstanding, conditional on at least one loan outstanding
Owns animals Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns animals for business purposes
Owns dwelling Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns at least one dwelling (ger, house, and/or apartment)
Owns fence Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns a fence around the dwelling
Owns HH appliances Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns large household appliances (refrigerator, cooler, washing machine)
Owns tools/machinery Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns tools and/or machinery for business use
Owns vehicle Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns a vehicle (car, lorry, tractor and/or motorbike)
Owns well Dummy variable that is '1' if the HH owns a well near the dwelling
Partner enterprise Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent's spouse operates an enterprise but not jointly with the respondent
Percentage female business Percentage of total outstanding loan amount of the HH that is used for a female‐owned business
Percentage private use Percentage of total outstanding loan amount of the HH that is used for private purposes
Prior loans Number of loans taken by the HH over the last five years that had been fully repaid at the time of the baseline survey
Received transfers Value of monetary and in‐kind transfers received in last 12 months from non‐relatives (in 000's MNT) conditional on receipt
Saver Respondent indicated that she saves
Secured loans Percentage of loans that is collateralized
Self‐employed Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent is self‐employed
Sewing or shop Dummy variable that is '1' of the respondent operates a sewing business or shop conditional on having a business
Sole enterprise Dummy variable that is '1' if the respondent operates an enterprise independent from her spouse
Value of dwelling Value of the dwelling the HH lives in (in million MNT)
Wage earnings Average weekly wage earnings for wage earners  (in 000's MNT)
Years in existence Number of years since the establishment of the respondent's business
Village‐level data  (# villages = 40). Source: Village survey in Spring 2008
Banks in district Number of bank branches in the district
Distance to paved road Distance (in km) from the village to the nearest paved road
Distance to province centre Distance (in km) from the village to the province centre X
District area Total surface are of the district in km2
Doctors in district Number of doctors in the district X
Livestock in district Number of livestock (cattle, camels, horses, sheep, goats) in the district
Months Average number of months between the date when respondents in a village received the first loan and the follow‐up survey
Number Average number of loans received by the respondents in a village
People in district Number of people living in the district surrounding a village as well as that village itself
People in village Number of people living in a village
Price bread Price of a loaf of bread (in MNT)
Price milk Price of a liter of milk (in MNT)
Price mutton Price of a kilo of mutton meat (in MNT)
Primary schools district Number of primary schools in district X
SCCs in district Number of Savings and Credit Cooperatives in the district
SS teachers Number of secondary school teachers in the district X
Time to paved road Time (in minutes) to travel from the village to the nearest paved road by car or motorcycle
Time to province centre Time (in minutes) to travel from the village to the province centre by car or motorcycle
Table A1.  Variable definitions
This table provides the names, definitions, and data sources of the variables used in the empirical analysis in alphabetical order. MNT = Mongolian tögrög.
Variable name
Standard control 
variable in impact 
analysis?
 
 
 
47
